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Abstract. Based on the foregoing work of Gontar, Hoermann, Deischl, and Haslbeck (2014), 
this paper presents different aspects of rater reliability in the context of a flight simulator 
study. For this purpose, 120 commercial airline pilots had to fly a challenging approach 
scenario in a full flight simulator. Afterwards, both the crew members and the instructor rated 
the non-technical skills separately for both pilots. Results indicate that social aspects of Crew 
Resource Management are subject to a broader rating variability than cognitive aspects are. 
Furthermore, it is indicated that a differentiation between the two crew members is not always 
possible for the raters.  
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Introduction 
 
For decades, it has been seen that non-technical skills are a vital element for safe flight 
operations. With the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) asking for the assessment of those non-
technical skills, the European project JARTEL (Joint Aviation Requirements Translation and 
Elaboration of Legislation) worked on a consolidated assessment method to evaluate pilots’ 
non-technical performance (Flin et al., 2003). 
 
The origin of such behavioral marker systems came up with the development of a 
checklist system called Line/LOS Checklist (LLC) (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Kello, Taggart, & 
Butler, 1990), which was developed from pilots’ attitudes towards cockpit management 
systems (Helmreich, 1984) and an analysis of accidents and incidents (Connelly, 1997; 
O'Connor, Hoermann, Flin, Lodge, & Goeters, 2002). Those checklist-based analysis systems 
have been used to develop different behavioral marker systems over the years (Flin & Martin, 
2001) and were finally incorporated within the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) 
(Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1999). LOSA was set up in order to collect data on how 
flight crews manage threats and errors during normal line operations. The crews’ performance 
is evaluated as a whole and not solely the individual pilots’ skills (Klinect, Murray, Merritt, & 
Helmreich, 2003). In addition, LOSA considers contextual data about the respective flight 
operation and even more on the organization itself (Flight Safety Foundation, 2005). Over the 
years, LOSA became one of the most commonly used evaluating schemes for the cockpit 
crews’ behavior and was validated in wide ranges (Flin & Martin, 2001); see Butler (1991) or 
Law and Wilhelm (1995) to mention only two important examples. 
 
  
311 
 
The goal of JARTEL’s new assessment system to rate pilots’ non-technical skills 
(NOTECHS) was to develop a feasible, efficient and Europe-wide marker system (van 
Avermaete & Kruijsen, 1998). Its objective was to assess pilots’ non-technical skills in order 
to enhance team cooperation among pilots as well as to improve their interpersonal and 
communicational behavior (Dietrich, Grommes, & Neuper, 2004; Fischer & Orasanu, 1999). 
The NOTECHS-consortium separated the behavioral markers into four different categories 
called: Cooperation, Leadership and Management, Situation Awareness, and Decision 
Making. Furthermore, it was stated that communication is inherent in every category and that 
it is not defined as a separate category (O’Connor et al., 2002). Each category has different 
items that are rated on a five-point scale from very poor to very good. After validation, the 
NOTECHS scheme itself was the groundwork for a new rating system incorporated within an 
airline’s performance rating system. For it, Burger, Neb, and Hoermann (2003) adapted the 
NOTECHS system to the airline’s own organizational culture and Crew Resource 
Management philosophy. They came up with four categories of interpersonal competencies 
where Communication is seen as a discrete dimension in addition to Leadership and 
Teamwork, Workload Management, and Situational Awareness and Decision Making. Using 
the adapted NOTECHS system, Gontar, Hoermann, Deischl, and Haslbeck (2014) examined 
flight crew members who mutually assessed their own and others’ CRM-skills after flying a 
simulator scenario. They found that self and peer ratings of pilots differ to a higher degree 
than one would expect. It was shown that pilots rate their own performance worse than their 
colleagues’ performance in all four dimensions, which might be an effect of pilots not 
wanting to unmask their colleagues. Furthermore, it was found that social factors are rated 
higher than cognitive factors, which might be a result of the scenario that was used. While 
those results are based on ANOVA analyses and therefore on mean value comparisons of the 
two involved pilots, the question about inter-rater reliability is not yet answered. Running 
such analyses, low correlations might represent and reveal different perceptions of one’s 
performance. 
 
 
Method 
 
Although Gontar et al. (2014) have shown that the source of a rating (self or peer rating) has a 
huge influence on the average level of the rating, the perceptions of the instructors were not 
taken into account. With this rating provided, it might be possible to see whose perceptions of 
the performance are more in accordance with those of a third non-participating instructor. To 
get an idea of the actual rater reliability, the first approach asks for differences of the inter-
rater reliability between the four rating dimensions, assuming that the reliability might depend 
on the specific dimension which is rated. This possible influence was already indicated by 
O’Connor et al. (2002) showing the dependencies of the inter-rater agreement on the flight 
scenarios. So this can be formulated as a global research question (RQ): 
 
RQ1: How good is the inter-rater reliability of the three raters based on the four 
dimensions of the adapted NOTECHS? 
 
Assuming only low inter-rater reliability as seen in Flin and Martin (2001), a coherent 
approach asks for the origin of those effects, which leads to more specific research questions: 
 
RQ2: Which raters agree on which dimension and to what degree? Are there particular 
raters that do not agree with each other?   
 
To answer the stated research questions, a test design according to Figure 1 was 
established. According to Gontar et al. (2014), both pilots rate themselves (self rating) and 
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their colleagues (peer rating). In addition, an instructor pilot rates the two pilots differently as 
well (supervisor rating). 
 
 
Figure 1. Ratings conducted by the three raters based on Gontar et al. (2014) 
 
 
The CRM skills that are assessed are based on the internal company assessment 
guidelines (Burger, Neb, & Hoermann, 2003), which refer to the mentioned and adapted 
NOTECHS scheme (O’Connor et al., 2002), and are known to all raters (pilots and instructor) 
in advance. The rating is based on four dimensions which are defined as a dependent variable 
with four levels: Communication (1), Leadership and Teamwork (2), Work Organization (3), 
and Situation Awareness and Decision Making (4). Therein, (1) and (2) address the social 
factors, whereas in contrast (3) and (4) refer to cognitive factors (Gontar et al., 2014). Those 
dimensions are assessed with the aid of a total of 40 items. The underlying five-point scale 
leads from the most negative rating “--” to the most positive rating “++”. To avoid bias when 
filling out the rating forms, the three raters were separated into different rooms. 
 
To cover a broad variety of performance in the different aspects, a challenging mission 
has to be flown by several crews of commercial pilots holding valid licenses. For this 120 
pilots (60 Captains, 60 First Officers) were randomly chosen from a commercial airline 
conducting a landing mission with a double malfunction, which itself is based on one single 
underlying failure. The Captains (CPTs), including one female, were M = 47, SD = 6 years 
and had M = 13,380, SD = 3,626 hours of flight experience, the First Officers (FOs), 
including five females, were M = 33, SD = 5 years and had M = 5,325, SD = 2,723 hours of 
flight experience (Gontar et al., 2014). Ratings and simulator handling were alternately 
conducted by two retired instructor pilots. The flight mission using two JAR STD 1A Level D 
full flight simulators began with the aircraft being fully configured and established for a 
visual approach either to John F. Kennedy Airport (Airbus A340 fleet) or Nice Côte d'Azur 
Airport (Airbus A320 fleet) with fuel on board for approximately one hour of remaining flight 
time. When lowering the landing gear for the final configuration, the green hydraulic system 
leaked and consequently lost pressure and the total amount of hydraulic fluid. While only the 
main gear was locked, the nose gear could not have been locked and remained in an uncertain 
position and not able to retract. As the landing gear is extended, the aerodynamic drag is 
almost doubled and so is the fuel consumption, leading to a remaining flight time of 
approximately 30 minutes. The crew now had to abort their approach and proceed in the 
standard missed approach, while handling the procedures and deciding which runway to 
approach next.  
 
With the second approach and meanwhile the gear fully down and locked (using landing 
gear gravity extension), the slow movement of the flaps (only driven by one hydraulic 
system), led to their jamming. With 15 minutes of remaining fuel, the crew again had to 
complete further procedures and had to work through the malfunction of the flight controls. 
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At that time, the crew will have to decide whether to proceed with their checklists or to force 
a landing without the procedures being completed. It can be expected that only a part of the 
flight crews will manage to complete all the checklists and procedures within the mission; 
other crews are expected to fail at some point due to the enormous time pressure. 
 
The whole simulation experiment took place at a flight training facility for a duration of 
20 nights, where three crews participated every night. After a demographic questionnaire 
being completed by the participants, the crews were randomly paired and one after the other 
went through the scenario, which lasted about 30 minutes. Afterwards, the two pilots, as well 
as the instructor, rated their CRM performance independently from each other based on the 
introduced rating forms. A debriefing concerning decision making completed the 
experimental process.  
 
 
Results  
 
Regarding the global approach, the intraclass correlation analysis compares the three different 
judgments of the three raters (self, peer, supervisor) for the two subjects (CPT and FO) using 
a two-way random model. Table 1 shows the results based on consistency agreements for 
both subjects. 
 
Table 1. Intraclass correlation coefficient of the ratings for the respective subjects 
ICC COM L&T WO SA&DM 
CPT is rated .23 .10 .52 .48 
FO is rated .08 .03 .45 .47 
 
 
Both ratings show relatively low intraclass correlation coefficients (ICCs) for the social 
aspects but relatively high ICCs for the cognitive aspects. Those results are in contrast to what 
was expected when assuming that social aspects are easier to observe and to evaluate. It 
seems that the pilots have either different perceptions or diverging expectations of good 
communication and leadership & teamwork. However, the cognitive aspects, which have to 
be concluded from observed behaviors show substantially higher consensus among the raters. 
 
To get a more detailed idea of where those different ratings have their origin, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient between each pair of ratings is calculated. For better and easier 
interpretation, the aspects of Communication and Leadership & Teamwork are merged to 
social aspects as well as Work Organization and Situation Awareness & Decision Making are 
merged to cognitive aspects, using Fisher-Z transformations. Figure 2 shows those correlation 
coefficients using the notation .social/.cognitive aspects for the coefficients and Rater → 
Subject to identify the source and the target of the ratings. For example, the rating of the 
instructor for the Captain (INST → CPT) correlates with the rating of the instructor for the 
First Officer (INST → FO) with .65 for the social skills and with .82 for the  cognitive skills.  
 
All the coefficients of social aspect ratings represent a lower correlation than for the 
cognitive aspects in every combination. Although the cognitive aspects were expected to be 
more difficult to observe (O’Connor et al., 2002), it seems that the raters are more in 
agreement when delivering their judgments. A possible explanation could be that the mental 
model of what is a good or adequate behavior regarding communication and leadership & 
teamwork varies greatly between the raters, at least in this scenario. Moreover, the evaluation 
of good social performance might imply more interpretation producing this higher degree of 
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variability. As the success of this scenario is mainly subject to the right decisions at the right 
time as well as to good work organization, which implies good cognitive skills, the 
performance of those aspects needs less interpretation, because they can simply reflect the 
outcome of the flight. The overall performance of the entire mission might also be assigned to 
those cognitive aspects as they are considered more critical.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Correlation coefficients between the particular ratings (Rater → Subject), where the 
coefficients represent the social and cognitive aspects of the adopted NOTECHS scheme. 
Those coefficients are arranged as following: .social/.cognitive. The solid lines show the 
correlations between the ratings of one rater; the dashed and dotted line show the correlations 
for the same subject, which is rated. 
 
 
When looking at the ratings from one rater, the correlations are expected to be rather 
low, since the subjects rated are different (solid lines in Figure 2). However, both dimensions 
of the instructor’s rating for the two pilots (INST → CPT and INST → FO) have a high 
correlation (.65 and .82). It seems that the instructor does not distinguish between the two 
crew members and rates the crew as one entity. The same finding holds true for the two other 
raters (CPT and FO) with their related ratings (CPT: .51/.62, FO: .71/.73). While the 
instructor sees the crew from an outside point of view, the pilots involved in the mission may 
also see themselves as one crew and perceive the crews’ CRM as a team result. Single 
contributions cannot be assigned directly to one of the pilots. Those results may further 
indicate that a differentiated rating of two pilots forming a crew is not always possible, 
perhaps also not useful. 
 
The ratings for one target were assumed to show high correlations as they evaluate the 
same person and therefore one performance (dashed and dotted lines in Figure 2). In contrast, 
to the correlations of the ratings conducted by one person, the ratings for one subject correlate 
rather low. This means that every rater has a different perception and understanding of the 
subjects’ performance. Gontar et al. (2014) already showed that the self rating is consistently 
less positive than the peer rating. A comparable bias might be observed here as well. Thereby, 
it is interesting to see that the ratings of the instructor correlate more with those of the FO 
than with those of the CPT. Although the CPTs are assumed to have more experience and 
expertise, this cannot be confirmed by the accuracy of their NOTECHS-ratings. The higher 
correlation of the ratings between INST and FOs may be based on better subjective perception 
by the FO when defining the instructors’ rating as the gold standard. A contrary approach 
might follow the line of thought that the instructor, who is also a CPT with special trainings, 
does not have the insight of the real scenario and so the participating CPT’s expected 
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performance on the team is higher. Consequently, the CPT might evaluate a situation where 
he is part of the crew, differently and more differentiated than a situation, where he serves as 
an instructor. Analyses of further correlation coefficients are not conducted since respective 
research questions have not been formulated.  
 
 
Discussion & Conclusion 
 
The presentation of the results shows the broad variation between different pilots rating the 
same subject. Answering RQ1, this means that only a rather low inter-rater reliability was 
measured differing between social and cognitive aspects. Possible explanations are given 
above and are subject to further investigations and discussions. The findings seem to partly 
coincide with those of O’Connor et al. (2002), which show that complex scenarios, where 
more interpretation is needed, might lead to lower inter-rater reliability when assessing 
NOTECHS. In contrast to their findings, where the inter-rater reliability was nearly .8, the 
results in this paper are way off. However, it must be kept in mind that O’Connor et al. (2002) 
used instructor pilots that rated the crew and calculates their inter-rater reliability. A different 
approach was used here. Our goal was to examine where different perceptions become 
evident. Nevertheless, the low degree of agreement between the three raters might have an 
influence on operational safety and flight training, which both depend on a common 
understanding of the crew status and on adequate feedback. The analyses concerning RQ2 
showed that the perceptions, and therefore the ratings, highly depend on the rater himself and 
less on the rated subject. If the perception of the crew members differ much from the 
perception of the instructors, it will be difficult for the trainees to accept possible suggestions 
for improvement. An integrated approach to solve this problem could be to train the pilots 
from the beginning on how to notice and how to judge CRM related aspects during flight 
operations and simulator missions. When arguing in this direction, one has always to be aware 
that the crew was not explicitly trained to use standardized rating methods, but is trained on 
what those aspects mean. 
 
Another important factor is that it seems not all the raters are able to or willing to 
distinguish between the two crew members’ performance. On the one hand side this could be 
due to the crew establishing a good common ground and mental model, but on the other hand, 
it leads to less powerful feedbacks. There may be a notion that if one crew member is 
especially good in one aspect, he biases the rating for his colleague; or in other words: it can 
be assumed that specific items and performance aspects are not only rated better, but are 
actually better, if only one crew member performs very well.  
 
 
References 
 
References marked with an asterisk (*) indicate secondary literature from O’Connor et al. 
(2002) 
 
Burger, K.-H., Neb, H. and Hörmann, H.-J. (2003). Lufthansa's new basic performance of 
flight crew concept - A competence based marker system for defining pilots 
performance profile. Proceedings of The 12th International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, 1, 172–175. 
Butler, R. (1991). Lessons from cross-fleet/cross-airline observations: Evaluating the impact 
of CRM/LOFT training. In R. S. Jensen (Ed.), Proceedings of the 6th Symposium of 
Aviation Psychology (pp. 326–331). Columbus, OH: Ohio State University. 
316 
 
*Connelly, P. (1997). A resource package for CRM developers: Behavioral markers of CRM 
skills from real world case studies and accidents (Tech. Rep. No. 97-3). Austin, TX. 
Dietrich, R., Grommes, P., & Neuper, S. (2004). Language processing. In T. M. Childress & 
R. Dietrich (Eds.), Group interaction in high risk environments (pp. 87–101). 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Fischer U., & Orasanu, J. (1999). Say it again, Sam! Effective Communciation strategies to 
mitigate pilot error. In R. Jensen & L. Rakovan (Eds.), Proceedings of the 10th 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology (pp. 362–366). Columbus, Ohio. 
Flight Safety Foundation. (2005). Line operations safety audit (LOSA) provides data on 
threats and errors. Flight Safety Digest, 24(2), 1–18. 
Flin, R., & Martin, L. (2001). Behavioral markers for crew resource management: A review 
of current practice. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 11, 95–118. 
Flin, R., Martin, L., Goeters, K.-M., Hörmann, H.-J., Amalberti, R., Valot, C., & Nijhuis, H. 
(2003). Development of the NOTECHS (non-technical skills) system for assessing 
pilots’ CRM skills. Human Factors and Aerospace Safety, 3(2), 95–117. 
Gontar, P., Hoermann, H.-J., Deischl, J., & Haslbeck, A. (2014). How Pilots Assess Their 
Non-Technical Performance – A Flight Simulator Study. In T. Ahram, W. Karwowski, 
& T. Marek (Eds.), Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Applied Human 
Factors and Ergonomics . Krakow. 
*Helmreich, R. L. (1984). Cockpit management attitudes. Human Factors, 26, 583–589. 
*Helmreich, R. L., Klinect, J. R., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999). The line operations safety audit 
(LOSA) observer’s manual, version 7.0 (Tech. Rep. 99-0). Austin, TX. 
*Helmreich, R. L., Wilhelm, J. A., Kello, J. E., Taggart, W. R., & Butler, R. (1990). 
Reinforcing and evaluationg crew resource management: Evaluator/LOS instructor 
reference manual: Technical Manual 90-2. Austin, TX. 
Klinect, J. R., Murray, P., Merritt, A. C., & Helmreich, R. L. (2003). Line Operations Safety 
Audit (LOSA) - Definition and operating characteristics. In Proceedings of the 12th 
International Symposium on Aviation Psychology . Dayton, OH. 
Law, J., & Wilhelm, J. (1995). Ratings of CRM skill markers in domestic and international 
operations. In R. S. Jensen (Ed.), Proceedings of the 8th Symposium of Aviation 
Psychology (pp. 669–675). Columbus, OH: Ohio State University. 
O'Connor, P., Hoermann, H.-J., Flin, R., Lodge, M., & Goeters, K.-M. (2002). Developing a 
Method for Evaluating Crew Resource Management Skills: A European Perspective. 
The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 12(3), 263–285. 
doi:10.1207/S15327108IJAP1203_5   
Van Avermaete, J. A. G. & Kruijsen, E. (1998). NOTECHS - The evaluation of non-technical 
skills of multipilot aircrew in relation to the JAR-FCL requirements - Final Report 
NLR-CR-98443. Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
 
 
Contact Information 
 
Patrick Gontar 
Institute of Ergonomics 
Technische Universität München 
Boltzmannstr. 15  
85747 Garching, Germany 
Tel. +49.89.28915428 
E-mail. gontar@tum.de 
  
